October 2024
In its 214th book, “October 7: Events of the Flood of the Islamists,” published October 2024, the Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Center examines the strategic changes in jihadist groups and Islamist organizations following the attacks of October 7th, 2023. It focuses especially on Al-Qaeda, ISIS, the Muslim Brotherhood, and their affiliated branches.
The attacks furnished these groups with an opportunity to revive the discourse of violence, enhance group communication, and intensify their competition for recruitment. They also renewed their focus on tactics involving surprise and long-term preparation, while employing the concept of long-term political action to support surprise military attacks against state actors. Lastly, these developments raised the prospect of cross-sectarian cooperation, reaffirming political Islam as “one religious sect.”
The book’s opening study, by Egyptian researcher Ahmed Sultan, highlights the effects of the October 7 operation on Al-Qaeda. He aligns with the idea of “mutual service” between Al-Qaeda and Iran, noting that the presence of “Seif el-Adl” in Iran has contributed to overcoming ideological barriers between the Sunni and Shi’ite strains of Islamism.
Sultan points out that the attacks energized the violent strains of Islamism, benefiting both Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Qaeda equates the October 7, 2023 operation with the September 11, 2001 attacks and adopts the theory of “uniting the battlefields” in its approach. He also notes the possible influence of Iran on the organization, suggesting that Seif’s extended stay in Tehran and contacts with its intelligence and security services shaped the strategic decisions of Al-Qaeda’s current leader.
Regarding ISIS, Egyptian researcher Mounir Adeeb examines how the organization has exploited October 7th to expand its movement and drive recruitment. He also concludes that ISIS’s operational restrictions have eased, owing to growing sympathy in certain quarters.
The Muslim Brotherhood has benefited from the October 7 event and the subsequent conflicts and, consequently, grown bolder and less risk-averse. It has reenergized its ideological discourse, amplified attempts at stirring discontent and rebellion, and renewed its determination to challenge state authority. The book thus addresses three models of interaction.
Tunisian researcher Ahmed Nazif identifies two models: the Society of Peace (Mujtamaa el-Selm, also known by its Arabic acronym Hams) in Algeria and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco. His study compares these groups. Despite differences, he reveals that October 7 reproduced a new form of Islamic internationalism. Both parties employ the narrative of injustice perpetrated against Palestinians to build intersecting local and international networks and reinvigorate their project of attaining “Tamkeen” (domination and control), and to regain some of the ground they lost in the wake of the Arab Spring’s decline.
The third model comes from Jordan, analyzed by Jordanian researcher Saud Al-Sharfat. His study analyzes the electoral gains of the Islamic Action Front in the Jordanian parliament, where it won 31 out of 138 seats, constituting 22% of parliament members—a feat without precedent in over three decades.
Hassan Al-Beidani discusses the involvement of Iranian-aligned factions and militias on the battlefield, responding to ideological calls and undermining Iraqi national and regional security. These factions adopt their own version of “uniting the battlefields,” posing threats to Iraq’s national security. He highlights the renewed debate on the state’s monopoly on arms and the need to curb parallel armies.
Sultan Al-King argues that Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s support for Hamas may imply indirect support for the Iranian axis, a sort of “separating the battlefields” by supporting Hamas while opposing Hezbollah. This dynamic requires careful balancing in Idlib. Al-King notes that the relatively secular Free Syrian Army has lost influence in favor of growing jihadist movements, notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, today the strongest actor in northwest Syria, after severing ties with al-Qaeda in 2016. HTS’s main rival is the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. HTS has sought to reposition itself by confining its activity to Syria so as to avoid active counterterrorism measures by international actors, but October 7 may motivate it to reclaim Aleppo.
Examining the event’s implications for terrorist groups and their appetite for surprise attacks, Mohamed Ismail reviews jihadist groups active in the African Sahel. These groups view October 7th similarly to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, elevating it to a global symbolic level, as demonstrated by Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (Support for Islam and Muslims). The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISIS of the African Sahel) recently claimed several terrorist attacks against the Malian army, describing them as “revenge for the Muslims of Gaza,” escalating terrorist activity in the region.
Lorenzo Vidino’s study explores aspects of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas networks in Europe, noting the positions of various European governments. Most politicians and security agencies do not sympathize with Hamas but do not consider it a direct threat to Europe. They prioritize resources toward groups like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and neo-Nazi organizations. Vidino outlines the difficulties in prosecuting Hamas members in Europe, which stem from their focus on fundraising and political activity rather than attacks.
Additionally, conducting extensive investigations against networks that do not pose security threats increases exposure to accusations of Islamophobia and of “serving Israeli interests,” which European security services and prosecutors seek to avoid. The distinction remains between Hamas, classified as a terrorist organization, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which is not so classified in Europe, unless tangible concerns arise.
Regarding the attacks’ repercussions, Vidino states they first stimulate European Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood networks and their allies, emboldening them to organize protests, launch solidarity campaigns, and initiate various other activities both online and offline.
In conclusion, Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Center thanks the researchers who contributed to this book and those who facilitated its publication. We hope it fills a gap in the Arab academic library.
Editor-in-Chief
Omar Al-Bashir Al-Turabi
October 2024
